


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THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM

BUDAPEST, 1928


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
The oro- and hydrographic map of pre-war Hungary showing the Trianon frontiers.

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I.

The War Responsibility of Hungary.

The Peace Treaty charges Hungary with responsibility for the provocation of the Great War and it accordingly inflicts a severer punishment upon her than upon the other vanquished States, including the annexation of two thirds of her territory. It would thus seem that Hungary is assigned the chief share of the war guilt.

On the other hand we can prove that the Hungarian Government never took a leading part in the direction of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy, while Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, in his Memorandum of July 1 to Francis Joseph I., and again at the session of the Cabinet Council held on July 7, emphatically protested against the proposed declaration of war upon Serbia.

Among the secret documents published since the end of the Great War, more than fifty have come to light which bear witness to the fact that the Russian Government intended to partition Hungary by force of

arms, and had even promised certain specific regions to foreign States, — promises made prior to 1914, when they could not have been fulfilled except by war. It is obvious therefore, that the direct responsibility for bringing about the Great War rests with Russia.

The Peace Treaties upon the basis of which the new order in Europe is built, contain two notable errors: 1. the question of war guilt, and 2. the tendentious ethnographical data on the basis of which the new map of Central Europe was drawn up. Already after the lapse of scarcely ten years, History has exploded the one-sided and superficial verdict of the Peace Treaties whereby the Central Powers are to pay both in territory and in treasure for their supposed responsibility for the war. It has become clear moreover to all responsible students of the situation that the statistics upon which these new ethnographical boundaries of Central Europe are based, are tendentious, inaccurate and in many cases positively mendacious. That which was comprehensible and psychologically excusable when the Peace Treaties were negotiated, cannot be accepted or condoned by the ethical standards which obtain to-day; still less can they be justified without undermining the very foundations upon which our civilisation is based.

We do not desire to dwell upon the odious question of war guilt: this is now being examined with competence and increasing earnestness by the *savants* and historians of America, England and the neutral States. Nevertheless we feel bound to state briefly but emphatically that Hungary never had any desire to expand in the Balkans; that therefore Count Stephen Tisza, even after the assassination at Serajevo, was definitely against

a war in the Balkans; that later on he set his face against all annexation; and finally that the whole Hungarian Cabinet were opposed to the war.

If the revelations of the latter years are genuine, — and up to the present no one has disputed their authenticity, — it is clear that Hungary had of necessity to stand on the defensive against the Russian attack.

It is charged against Count Tisza that at the session of the common — Austrian and Hungarian — Cabinet Council held on July 19, 1914, he did not raise his voice against the war. But those who attack him for this forget that at the time he was in possession of data which made it impossible for the Monarchy to avoid taking the offensive, and *inter alia* a report describing the journey of M. Sasonov, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Roumanian Prime Minister, M. Bratianu, to Brassó, in Hungarian Transylvania, in the middle of June, 1914, when the former had pointed out the land which Roumania would obtain from Hungary with the assistance of Russia. He also knew of the military preparations which were being carried out in Russia. And he knew that on July 14, M. Sasonov had categorically declared that, if any Power were to attempt to exercise a restraining influence at Saint-Petersburg, he would reject it in advance.

Tisza was faced with the alternative of either abandoning the defence and allowing Hungary to become the prey of ten million Russian soldiers, or remaining loyally at the head of the nation and fighting out to the end the life-and-death struggle precipitated by Russia.

In spite of this, he withheld his consent to the ultimatum to Serbia until July 19 and then he gave it

only on condition that Serbia's territory and political independence should remain intact. This is in obvious and striking contrast to the action of the Russian Government which, at a time of complete peace, promised Hungarian territory to foreign countries.

According to Baron Giessl's *Memoires*, Tisza did not consider that Austria-Hungary would be justified in refusing to accept Serbia's answer, since he knew very well that the refusal would precipitate the Russian offensive. He accepted his share of responsibility merely because the war was forced upon Hungary.

Not so well-known are Count Tisza's efforts to hinder unrestricted submarine warfare. He went so far in the defence of his standpoint as nearly to cause a crisis in the higher command of the German army.

In January 1917, the leading statesmen and military commanders of the Central Powers were invited to a conference in Berlin. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was represented by Count Tisza, but certain important economic questions had brought Baron Joseph Harkányi, Minister of Commerce, and Baron Emeric Ghillányi, Minister of Agriculture, to Berlin at the same time. On the German side there were Fieldmarshal Hindenburg, General Ludendorf, Chief of Staff, Grand Admiral Kösster, Admiral of the Fleet Von der Recke, Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the Foreign Minister Herr Zimmermann, and Herr Helfferich, the Minister of Finance. The subject dealt with was the question of unrestricted submarine warfare.

After the Conference the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Prince Hohenlohe, gave a dinner to the members of the conference, in the course of which he turned to Baron Ghillányi with the following question:

„Does Your Excellency know that Count Tisza nearly created a crisis in the higher command of the Central Powers?“

As Baron Ghillányi seemed surprised at the unexpected question, the Prince went on to explain his words:

At that morning's conference the German military leaders had declared, in vindication of their plans for unrestricted submarine warfare, that it was the only means of bringing the war to a speedy end. Herr Bethmann-Hollweg had said that he had full confidence in the plans of the General Staff, which had the Kaisers's approval, and had intimated that the conference had no right to take any but an affirmative decision, the question having already been definitively settled in higher quarters.

Thereupon Count Tisza rose and vehemently attacked the proposal, declaring that he was unable to believe in the success of submarine warfare, and did not share the Chancellor's opinion that the war would be shortened by it. On the contrary, it was his firm conviction that the situation would be aggravated and would finally induce the United States to enter the war.

Count Tisza's speech so impressed the German statesmen, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr Zimmermann and Herr Helfferich, that they came to share his pessimistic outlook. On the other hand, the representatives of the army declared that if the plan were refused they would withdraw, as they were unwilling to bear the responsibility for the continuation of the war.

The long discussion, which was undeniably dominated by Count Tisza's standpoint, ended in a postponement of the decision till the afternoon.

In the meantime the German Government and the General Staff had a conference with the Kaiser which entirely changed the situation. The military members of the conference declared in the name of the Kaiser, that the latter had exact information to the effect that the entrance of the United States into the war was a foregone conclusion and would occur independently of the submarine war.

This declaration determined the debate and Count Tisza was forced to accept the Kaiser's declaration as a basis for his decision and to bow before his arguments. The new submarine program was adopted by the conference.

Forced to abandon his original standpoint, Count Tisza demanded that his opinion and his reasons for abandoning that opinion should be recorded in the minutes of the conference.

We are confident that these incontrovertible facts will convince American public opinion that Hungary was not responsible for the unrestricted submarine warfare. Count Tisza, the representative of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, opposed the plan of General Ludendorff and Grand Admiral Tirpitz, but was overruled by forces against which his utmost efforts proved unavailing.

While the war was in progress, Tisza was among the first to raise his voice in favour of peace and in his private letters he repeatedly expressed his disapproval of the war.

It is clear therefore that Hungary's responsible Minister was opposed to the war. He even announced that in the event of victory he would not lay claim to any

foreign territory; his one desire was to retain that which had belonged to Hungary before the war.

In contrast to this, those who are making the loudest outcry about Hungary's war guilt are the very States which, having profited by her dismemberment, now declare their determination to retain their ill-gotten gains even at the price of further bloodshed.

II.

Treatment of Alien Enemies Stranded in Hungary during the War.

We think we may safely state, since it has been freely admitted by our late antagonists, that even when the Great War was at its height, the alien enemies in our midst were treated with the utmost consideration. Many British, Americans and French have borne testimony to this.

It had been the desire of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff that the measures taken against enemy subjects in Austria — confinement in internment camps for the majority, and police supervision in a few exceptional cases, — should be applied also in Hungary. But the Hungarian Government, and especially the Ministry of the Interior, held a different view. Decree no. 3009 issued on August 27, 1914, provided for the retention of aliens liable for military service, but arranged that those belonging to one and the same family should not be separated without due reason. It also decreed that foreigners who had been living in the country for a

long time and whose conduct was not suspect, should be left undisturbed in their homes if they were in a position to support themselves. Accordingly many language teachers, office-employees, factory-officials, trainers and jockeys were allowed to remain at their posts, the last-named being even permitted to attend the Vienna races. On November 16, 1914, the Minister of the Interior, in his ordinance no. 8626, ordered that particulars should be taken of all aliens, so that the question of their repatriation might be considered; while on January 22, 1915, the French and English who were declared suitable for repatriation, were invited to state in their own language and over their own signatures, whether they preferred to stay or to leave the country.

Similar measures were taken on May 8, June 24 and July 20, 1915, with regard to Serbs, Italians and Russians who were qualified for repatriation.

On May 16, 1917, the Minister of the Interior issued an order which provided that every American citizen, irrespective of age and sex, might leave for Switzerland within four weeks; later on, on July 20, he again announced that Americans were at liberty to leave the country if they so wished. A similar order was issued on September 18, 1917, with regard to Chinese subjects.

It was only in special cases or as acts of reprisal that sterner measures were employed, as for instance when it was proved that Hungarians stranded in Roumania were subjected to harsh and inhuman treatment. At that time the Minister of the Interior ordered all Roumanians in this country between the ages of 17 and 55 to be interned.

At the beginning of the war the delivery of postal consignments to aliens was subjected to certain restrictions. But these became less severe every year. The nursing of the sick, medical treatment, free medicaments and warm winter clothing were also provided for humanity's sake for all kinds of aliens in our midst. The American Consul General in Vienna convinced himself of this fact during his frequent visits to Hungary.

III.

The Geographical and Economic Unity of Hungary.

The geographical area of pre-war Hungary, including Croatia, covered 325,411 square kilometres. This territory was a self-contained geographical entity. On the North-East, North, East and South-East, it was surrounded by the ranges of the Carpathians; in the South its boundaries were formed by the Lower Danube, the Drave and the Save; in the West by the Leithe. Thus the territory of pre-war Hungary was a rare example of a country whose political boundaries are not the result of force, nor even of ethnographical conditions, but only of nature. When Kings Louis the Great and Matthias overstepped these natural boundaries for the sake of politics, they soon found themselves obliged to retreat.

This „ideal geographical entity“ became the foundation also of an economic entity.

Budapest, the beautiful metropolis of the middle Danube, was situated beside the ruins of the ancient Roman city of *Acquincum*, in the centre of the country,

and was consequently its natural economic centre. The forests of the North supplied what the Great Plain needed of timber, in exchange for which the hilly areas were supplied with wheat. Between spring and autumn the men of the highlands hired themselves out as agricultural labourers in the plains and thus procured the food which was to carry them through the winter. On the other hand the industries of the hilly regions found a market in the plains. To this very intensive system of exchange and reciprocity we owe the fact that the economic history of pre-war Hungary never knew the crises so frequent in improductive areas.

This twofold unity was shattered by the Treaty of Trianon owing to erroneous data, superficiality, invincible prejudice and nationalist aspirations; and the injustice committed when Poland was divided was repeated over again.

IV.

What Hungary has Lost in Consequence of the Treaty of Trianon.¹⁾

1. Under the Treaty of Trianon 62,937 square kilometres of territory were ceded to *Czechoslovakia*, i. e. 19.34 per cent. of the whole. On this territory the Slovak population numbers 1,702,064; the Hungarian 1,084,343; the German 266,047; the Ruthenian 435,892, while other minorities make up 87,339. *Of these, 858,308 Hungarians and 53,946 Germans live in homogeneous blocs along the frontiers of present Hungary.*

2. Under the same Treaty *Roumania* was given 102,787 square kilometres of Hungarian territory, i. e. 31.59 per cent. of the whole. On this territory there live 2,800,073, Roumanians, 1,704,851 Hungarians, 559,824 Germans and 266,701 other minorities. *Of these, 402,673 474,418 Hungarians, and 182,405 Germans live close to the Hungarian frontier.*

¹⁾ The statistical data are taken from nos. 7—8 (July and August, 1923) of the Hungarian Statistical Review published by the Royal Hungarian Central Statistical Bureau.

3. 20,956 square kilometres were ceded to *Yugoslavia*, i. e. 6·44 per cent. On this territory there are 471,804 Serbs and Croats, 457,597 Hungarians, 304,111 Germans and 200,696 other minority peoples. *Of these, Hungarians, and 223,245 Germans live in language areas contiguous with Hungary.* The territory of *Croatia*, also transferred to Yugoslavia covers 42,541 square kilometres (13·07 per cent.)

4. *Austria* received 5,055 square kilometres (1·55 per cent.) and

5. Fiume was transferred to Italy with a territory of 21 square kilometres. (0·01 per cent.)

Only 91,243 square kilometres (28·1 per cent.) of her former territory and 7,515,886 (36·00 per cent.) of her former inhabitants have been left to Hungary.

These figures will suffice to prove how badly informed were the authors of the Trianon Treaty and what misleading data they were obliged to work upon, if they could regard more than three million Hungarians as insignificant language islands.

The following data will show how hardly the Hungarians, — who took part in the war against their will, — have been dealt with by the Treaty:

Hungarian speaking people in Hungary were :

11.820,416 of which 7.132,956 (60·3%) remain.

Germans were.....	1.903,357	remain	521,344	27·4%
Slovaks " 	1.946,337	" 	165,866	8·5 "
Roumanians were	2.948,186	" 	48,948	1·7 "
Ruthenians " 	464,270	" 	1,216	0·3 "
Croats and Serbs were	654,324	" 	63,261	2·6 "

Data showing Hungary's economic losses:

Of *agricultural land* she had:

Wheat producing	5.752,341	cad. acres	while	2.625,928	acres	remain
Rye	1.879,447	"	"	1.182,388	"	"
Barley	1.929,353	"	"	911,902	"	"
Oats	1.862,629	"	"	598,967	"	"
Maize	4 267,397	"	"	1.493,298	"	"
Potatoes	1.077,088	"	"	420,925	"	"

The volume of the horse-breeding industry has been reduced to 44·8 per cent. of the pre-war figure; of cattle breeding to 31·7, of sheep rearing to 31·3, of pig rearing to 51·7 and of wine producing to 22 per cent. The area of the forests was 12.641,939 cad. acres, of which remain 1.825,181 (13·2 per cent.) Of the 65,363 quintals of yearly petroleum production, of the 2.483,471 quintals salt and of the 3.019,308 quintals of gold and silver production nothing has been left.

Of the factories 48·09 per cent. have remained, with 402,688 h. p. while pre-war Hungary had 798,049 h. p while of the railway system of 19,724 kilometres merely 8,364 kilometres remain, and of 162.306,942 telephone stations only 16.243,131. The whole Western commerce is also lost.¹⁾

These depressing figures concern only the more important economic and industrial branches; but they will suffice to show the world why Hungary has become an economic wreck and why she must, in her present mutilated state, remain an open and bleeding wound on the body of Europe.

¹⁾ The facts contained in this chapter are illustrated by a few graphs on the last pages of this book.

V.

Hungarian Historic Unity.

For a thousand years Hungary has been a historic entity. The waves of the Tartar invasion broke against the solid rock of Magyar intrepidity. The Turkish invasion, which submerged the Balkans, was only partially able to break Hungary and after centuries of resistance the Turkish power collapsed. Hungary in defending her historic unity, defended also the civilisation of the West.

But the Turkish advent entirely changed the ethnographic aspect of the country.

The infiltration of the Roumanians had begun during the XII. century, but it was the Turkish invasion which caused them to pour in great masses into Transylvania, while at the beginning of the XVIII. century the Serbs began to people the devastated parts of Southern Hungary. All this, however, did not affect the unity of the historic State. It was left for the Treaty of Trianon to break up Hungary on the pretext of satisfying national aspirations. The Hungarian Constitution has a development of a thousand years behind it. The

Golden Bull was issued by King Andrew the Second in 1222, only two years after the framing of the British *Magna Charta*. Yet it was declared at Trianon that a thousand years of possession did not establish a right, although the French title to Alsace-Lorraine is based upon a far briefer period of possession. The Peace Conference ordered Alsace-Lorraine to be returned to France by virtue of historic right, and at the same time, in defiance of all historic right, created four Alsace-Lorraines in Hungary.

VI.

The Millerand Letter.

The Covering Letter, signed by M. Millerand (at that time French Premier), with which the Entente Powers handed the peace terms to the Hungarian Delegates, is sufficient proof that the framers of the Treaty were aware of the injustice committed in the drawing up of the new frontiers. They had refused to permit plebiscites on the flimsy pretext that to refer the question of the frontiers to the people would not materially affect results arrived at by a profound investigation of the ethnographic relations and national aspirations of Central Europe. They had laid it down that „The ethnographic conditions in Central Europe are such that it is indeed impossible for the political frontiers in their total extent to coincide with the ethnical boundaries“; and yet the Covering Letter cannot entirely ignore the accusation of the Hungarian Delegation, that in annexing the nationalities Hungary has been deprived of compact bodies of Hungarians living in geographical and economic community with the rest of their previous fatherland. With regard to this charge, the Millerand letter says:

„True to the spirit by which they were inspired in tracing the frontiers fixed by the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers have nevertheless considered the case of the frontiers thus traced not corresponding precisely with the ethnical or economic requirements. An inquest held on the spot may, perhaps, make apparent the necessity of a displacement of the limits provided by the Treaty in certain parts. Such an inquest could not be actually pursued without indefinitely retarding the conclusion of a Peace desired by the whole of Europe. But when the Delimitation Commission will have commenced activity, should they find that the provisions of the Treaty in some spot, as is stated above, create an injustice which it would be to the general interest to efface, it shall be allowable to them to address a Report on this subject to the Council of the League of Nations. In this case the Allied and Associated Powers accept that the Council of the League may, under the same circumstances, at the request of one of the Parties concerned, offer their services for an amicable rectification of the original demarcation at the passages where a modification has been judged desirable by a Delimitation Commission. The Allied and Associated Powers are confident that this proceeding will furnish a convenient method for correcting all injustice in the demarcation of the frontiers against which objections not unfounded can be raised“.

Those who wish to know how this promise, emanating from the most competent quarter, has been fulfilled, have only to read the book of the American writer, Frances Kellor, entitled „Security against War“, in

which the comic nature of the frontier delimitation operations is described.

According to this book, the Frontier Delimitation Commission proposed to reunite the Vend areas in the South-Western parts of Hungary. Yugoslavia rejected the proposal on the ground that the frontier had been fixed by the Peace Treaty and accepted by the Yugoslav Parliament, and that therefore no alteration could be made in it without the sanction of Parliament. She was, however, willing to give up a road and a village, if Hungary would, in return, cede a few villages in the neighbourhood of Szabadka. After that the Council of the League of Nations naturally informed the Ambassadors' Council that the friendly mediation between the Hungarian and Yugoslav Governments had been barren of result and that consequently no change could be made in the frontier.

It was in this spirit that, disregarding the covering letter, the frontiers were fixed all along the line. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak Frontier Delimitation Commission declared, when the Hungarian Commissioners referred to the Millerand letter, that „the Commissioners of the Chief Allied Powers do not propose to discuss the Covering Letter, which has not been officially brought to their notice“. The ethnographical situation was entirely ignored and only economic and strategic considerations were taken into account, so that along the Czechoslovak, Roumanian and Yugoslav frontiers only a few tracts of some square kilometres with a few hundred inhabitants were restored to Hungary.

The only territory where, a year and a half later, — that is, after the Peace Treaty was signed — a plebiscite was taken, the city of Sopron and its environs,

was overwhelmingly in favour of Hungary, proving the unsoundness of the contention that an appeal to the population would not lead to any result materially different from the view entertained by the Powers in Paris.

How unjust were the new frontiers is best seen if we apply the principles laid down in M. Millerand's Covering Letter to the procedure followed by the Delimitation Commissions. We have already quoted a passage in this letter which said that the different races in Central Europe are so interwoven as to render it almost impossible to fix an ethnographic frontier. But this fact, though indubitable, should not have led to an entire disregard of ethnographic conditions when the Hungarian frontier was fixed, — on the contrary, in districts where Hungarians live unmixed with other races (as for example within the „Rothermere Frontier“) the principle of nationality and self-determination should have been made to prevail over economic and strategic considerations. Even if the peacemakers were compelled to transfer Hungarian isles, there was no reason why they should have transferred also large tracts of territory which were in no sense „isles“ and were not surrounded by other nationalities. It seems that in his ignorance M. Millerand believed that only Hungarian isles, that is to say, areas surrounded by other nationalities were taken from Hungary; yet the territory which Lord Rothermere demands back includes no such „isles“, but is, all of it, peopled by Hungarians and lies along the frontiers of present-day Hungary.

M. Millerand's Covering Letter closed with the following consoling phrase: „As to the isles of Magyar population passing under another sovereignty, the

Treaties for the Protection of Minorities already signed by Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and ratified by Czechoslovakia guarantee their entire safeguarding“.

The next Chapters will show how these States have fulfilled this primary obligation.

VII.

The Refugee Question.

The Succession States never cease to proclaim to the world that they treat the members of the national minorities humanely and with generosity, that they make no difference between them and the ruling race and that equality of rights prevails in their territory; in other words, that they treat the minorities in complete accordance with the spirit of the Peace Treaties.

In spite of this pleasing assurance the Report of the Hungarian Minister for Public Welfare on the four years' work of the National Refugees' Bureau states that the number of refugees from the Succession States to the mother country amounts to 450,000.

Of these refugees the greater part consisted of Hungarian and other minority officials expelled from Transylvania by the Roumanians who had declined to take the oath of allegiance. But many were forced to leave the country even after taking the oath, partly because they have failed to learn the language of the Succession State, partly because they refused to become tools for the disnationalisation of their native land.

The unjust measures of the land reform, carried out with signal ruthlessness as regards the Hungarian minority, was another factor which increased the number of refugees.

The Hungarian intelligentsia engaged in the liberal professions, as well as merchants and industrials, shared the same fate.

Besides these proceedings, the Roumanian Government used every other means at their disposal to reduce the number of Hungarians, specially in the towns.

In the Transylvanian towns the Roumanian element had always formed an insignificant minority. With a view to changing this, the Roumanian Government introduced the system of requisitioning lodgings, — a euphemism for turning people out of their homes and into the streets.

On January 15, 1919, a deputation of the officials of *Kolozsvár* waited on M. *Julius Maniu*, the President of the Governing Council, and declared that the Hungarian officials were willing, without taking the oath, to pledge themselves to perform their duty honestly and to abstain from politics. But M. Maniu rejected this proposal, the aim of the Roumanian Government being to deprive the officials of their means of subsistence and having made their lives intolerable, to compel them to leave Transylvania and be repatriated to Hungary.

From the spring of 1919 onwards, a flood of orders and by-laws was issued concerning eviction and housing. No sooner had one order been put into force than it was superseded by another. Thus the wildest confusion prevailed, in which the Roumanian officials worked their own sweet will.

In the spring of 1920 an order was issued according to which all persons who had come into the country after August 1, 1914, and were unable to prove their right of domicile by official documents, were to be treated as foreigners; likewise all officials who refused the oath of allegiance. A few months afterwards, a further order was issued which provided that those who „testify by words, by writing or by their acts that they do not intend to become Roumanian nationals“, and those who have no occupation or are undesirable elements, should also be treated as foreigners and expelled from the country.

Under these ordinances no Hungarian could feel secure in Transylvania.

Housing bureaux were organised in all the towns, whose procedures were usually as follows: a tenant would receive a written order from the bureau to quit his dwelling within two or three days — in some cases within twenty-four hours. From this order there was no appeal, and the luckless tenant had no choice but to ask for a railway truck in which to convey his furniture to the frontier.

Thousands of evictions were carried out in this way in the towns of Transylvania. Whole families, men, women and children were summarily turned out into the streets. But it was the Hungarian officials whose fate was the most appalling. Deprived of their salaries and ordered to leave their homes, they were in the shortest possible time reduced to penury. Under such circumstances they were obliged, unless they had been also expelled when their lodgings were requisitioned, — themselves to apply for permission to leave the country. These were the

persons who, according to the Roumanians, left Transylvania „of their own free will“.

The bitter feelings aroused in the Hungarian and German Transylvanians by the illegalities of the Roumanian Government and by the Agrarian Reform Act, were exploited by emigration agents who persuaded as many as possible to emigrate to South America. A scandalous case (the Herberger case) was brought to light in which it transpired that one of the leading spirits in the emigration affair was *General Vaitoianu*, younger brother of the Home Secretary, and that the whole enterprise was nothing but a gigantic swindle. When the Transylvanian National Party called the Government to account in regard to this scandal, the Home Secretary pleaded in his own defence that he had acted from patriotic motives in promoting the emigration of Hungarians and Germans, while the Foreign Minister, *M. Duca*, charged the opposition with unpatriotic conduct because they were indisposed to distinguish, in this barefaced swindle, between the Roumanian and the non-Roumanian subjects of the State.

In *Czechoslovakia* the Hungarians were and still are subjected to similar persecution.

One member after another of the Hungarian intelligentsia who happens to be inconvenient to the Czechoslovak Government, must submit to have his right of citizenship questioned, with the result that he is pronounced a foreigner and expelled from the country even though he and his family have lived in the place for generations.

The number of people who have returned to Hungary has been greatly augmented by the factory hands and employees in the highlands annexed to Czechoslo-

vakia. The high taxes, as well as the general industrial policy of the Czechoslovak State have paralysed and weakened the industries of the highlands to such a degree, that factories which have been working for years in the Slovak and Ruthenian districts are obliged to close down one by one, and naturally have to dismiss their workmen, who, being unable to find other employment, either move to Hungary or emigrate to foreign States. The obvious intention of this policy is to shield the Czech factories from competition.

After these experiences we can only regard as cynicism the oft-repeated declarations of the Governments of the Succession States, that they treat the members of the racial minorities with humanity and that the latter enjoy perfect freedom and equality in their territories.

VIII.

The Educational Policy of the Succession States.

The Treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon not only secure to the minorities the right of being instructed in their own language, but also allow them to erect, maintain and direct schools at their own expense. Provision is also made that the racial and religious minorities shall be granted proper and reasonable support from the public funds for their educational and charitable institutions.

In fact, however, the position in the different Succession States is as follows:

In *Czechoslovakia* the State restricts the right of the minorities to erect schools, declaring in the first paragraph of Article 120 of the Constitution that „the establishment of private educational institutes is allowed within the limits of the law only“. This means that the Czechoslovak State reserves to itself the administration of a right granted to the minorities in an international Treaty.

At present there are in Czechoslovakia 728 Hungarian elementary schools, 17 municipal schools, 2 secondary schools, 8 secondary schools in which tuition is also imparted in the Hungarian language, 1 agricultural and 1 industrial school. This number, however, cannot satisfy the educational needs of the whole Hungarian population, especially as the Government not only fails to provide for the erection of minority schools, but even closes, one by one, the old ones of every grade. Under various pretexts it refuses permission for new Hungarian schools to be set up, even on a denominational basis. Hungarian education is also weakened by the withdrawal of State subvention and by the difficulties which the Board of Education places in the way of Hungarian parents sending their children to Hungarian schools. The school inspectors decide officially, regardless of the parents' statement and subsequent protest, what the mother-tongue of the children is to be and which school they are to attend. A serious menace to Hungarian education is the fact that there is no Hungarian Teachers' Training College for either elementary or secondary school and that consequently it is impossible to supply future deficiencies in the ranks of the teaching staff. All these tricks and subterfuges in connection with Hungarian education serve the purpose of Czechisation though they do not convince us of the boasted democracy of the Czech Republic.

In *Roumania* the situation is no better

The Government, while annexing and Roumanising all the Hungarian State schools, at first allowed the Hungarian denominations to replace them at their own expense. Later on, however the Ministry of Public Instruc-

tion seems to have repented of its obedience to Treaty provisions and has done everything in its power to ruin these schools.

The first efficient means to this end was the withdrawal of all State subvention. In consequence of this the denominational schools and their teachers became much embarrassed financially. Besides this, so-called „culture zones“ have been set up in the purest Hungarian districts, where the Hungarian children are taught by Roumanian teachers with raised salaries.

Here as well as elsewhere the instruction of Roumanian is made to take up so much time that none remains for the Hungarian subjects. In the schools of the Roman Catholic religious orders instruction in the Hungarian language has been prohibited altogether.

When the war came to an end in 1918 there were in Transylvania 2626 Hungarian elementary schools, of which 1369 were State schools. The latter were all requisitioned by the Roumanian State, while the denominational schools were either closed down on various pretexts or deprived of their public character, so that in 1927 there were only 856 such schools. In 1918 there was one school for every 633 Hungarians, — in 1926 there was one for every 1940. In consequence of this reduction, the Hungarians have lost 60·8 per cent. of their elementary schools, 74·3 per cent. of their city schools, 63·5 per cent. of their lycées, 90·9 per cent. of their commercial schools and 75 per cent. of their teacher's training colleges. The Government refuses the minorities the right to erect a teachers' training college and a University.

Yugoslavia employs the same methods in her educational policy as Roumania and Czechoslovakia. While

in the two latter the denominational schools have been allowed, for the sake of appearances, to exist somehow, Yugoslavia has with a single stroke of the pen, or at least with a single Ministerial Order, confiscated every denominational elementary and secondary school. By this decree it obtained 622 elementary and 32 secondary schools. Not only were all the Hungarian minority schools obliterated; article 16 of the Constitution takes from the minorities the right of setting up or maintaining schools in the future even at their own expense, because in Yugoslavia all instruction in general, and elementary instruction in especial, may only be provided by the State or by private individuals. When the religious minorities attempted to found schools under the title of private schools, they were informed by the Minister that wherever a State school of a similar type existed, no private schools were permitted.

The Government declare that they maintain State schools for the minorities. But these are not schools with autonomous rights, merely State schools with parallel Hungarian classes, where the so-called national subjects (the Serb language and literature, history and geography) must be taught in the Serb language from the third elementary class upwards. Besides this arrangement, which is the same in practice, if not in theory, in Czechoslovakia and in Roumania, the Serb Government has instituted a so-called „chemical analysis“ of names, which consisted in the administrative or school authorities establishing by the sound of each child's surname his or her nationality and the school which accordingly it had to attend. All children with Slav-sounding names had to attend Serb schools. This served to decrease the number of minority pupils;

and as the State had fixed a certain minimum number for whose sake it was permissible to maintain schools, it necessarily reduced also the number of minority schools. Last year this system was seemingly abolished, but in practice it still exists.

If in addition to all this we mention that in Yugoslavia there is not a single Hungarian Training College for elementary and secondary school teachers, even in the form of parallel classes in the State Colleges, only one Hungarian chair at the Serb State Teachers' Training College, it is easy to imagine the fate awaiting the minority schools; in a few years there will be no Hungarian teachers left.

IX.

The Situation of the Minority Denominations.

In *Czechoslovakia* the religious minorities have many serious grievances; the chief among these, as we have seen, is the educational policy of the State. Besides this, the Hungarian Reformed Church of the Highlands is incurring serious losses through having still to wait for the ratification of its Constitution by the Government. State subvention has been withheld in many places or, if given, is irregularly remitted. In many places also Hungarian hymns have been prohibited and Hungarian sermons censored. To this may be added the ever-recurring grievance of all the Hungarian denominations that their clergy, professors and teachers are expelled from the country upon various pretexts. The proselytizing efforts of the Czech national Church are being favoured by the State, while every kind of difficulty and obstruction is placed in the way of the minority religions.

In *Roumania* the position of the Churches is regulated by Article 22 of the Constitution of 1923, which begins by declaring that:

„Freedom of conscience is absolute“.

After this it proceeds:

„The State guarantees to all Cults equal freedom and protection in so far as their practices are not inconsistent with public order, public morals and with the Laws of the State.

„The Christian Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches are Roumanian Churches.

„The Orthodox Roumanian Church, being the religion of the great majority of the Roumanians, is the dominant Church in the Roumanian State; the Greek Catholic Church has precedence over all other Cults.“

The distinction made by the Constitution between the different Churches is a source of grave injury to the minorities.

The Bishops of the two Roumanian Churches are all members of the Senate *ex officio*; while the other Churches can only send one Bishop each to it, and only if they have at least 200,000 adherents. On this basis the Bishop of the Unitarian Church is not a member of the Senate. This secondary and inferior position of the Western Christian Churches in comparison with the Oriental Church is an insult to the whole of the Western Christian World.

But it was the Agrarian Reform which most sensibly injured the minority Churches.

The Reform Act provides for the expropriation of all the landed (endowed) property of the schools and Churches. The only exception to this rule is that 200 or 100 cad. acres respectively are left to the archbishoprics, episcopacies and chapters, and 32 cad. acres to the parishes. Churches of fewer than 300 believers, and

chapels of ease of less than 100, are to have their entire property taken.

In a few cases even the church and the vicarage buildings of the minority parishes have been expropriated for the benefit of the Roumanians.

In the village of *Maros Szentimre*, for example, the small but beautiful old church belonging to the Presbyterians, which had been built by the great captain John Hunyadi to commemorate his victory over the Turks in 1442, was expropriated and handed over to the Greek Catholics. — In *Nagyszalonta* even a part of the Presbyterian cemetery was expropriated and distributed as agricultural land among the Roumanian peasants.

We will not in this place go into the expulsions, courtmartialling, imprisonment and physical maltreatment of Ministers and priests. A long list of ugly cases could be given from the first two or three years of the occupation. *A. Zoltán*, of Homorodszentmárton, *T. Űrmössy*, of Homorodszentpál, *A. Bartok* of Csegez, *C. Pethő* of Nyomát, Father *S. Sporny*, the priests *L. Stenczel*, *L. Kacsoh*, *Riethly*, *L. Tréján*, Canon *Hirschler*, etc. are all martyrs of Roumanian intolerance.

Article 12 of the Constitution of *Yugoslavia* regulates the situation of the different denominations, all of which are equal on paper. In practice the Greek Oriental Church is of course the favoured one.

The Serb Government has confiscated the schools belonging to the minority Churches and refuses them the right of founding new ones. It interferes with religious instruction; exacts that religious text books should be submitted to it for approval; and appoints the religious instructors. The Reformed and Lutheran Churches have not yet had their new Constitution approved;

the Concordat with the Holy See is still to be concluded, and to this day no inter-confessional law exists.

Here also the agrarian reform has deprived the Churches of their lands exceeding 518 cad. acres and so far no compensation has been paid. Many ecclesiastical buildings have been confiscated by the Government. The „Congregations of Mary“ have been prohibited in the schools, and the Government prescribes the prayers which are to be said in the Protestant Churches. A considerable number of the clergy has been expelled. Since the two Protestant Churches have no theological seminary and may not invite clergymen from Hungary, eleven parishes out of fifty-three are to-day without Ministers.

By way of illustrating the spirit which guides the ecclesiastical policy of the Yugoslav Government, we submit the following figures:

The *Greek Oriental Church* represents 46·6 per cent of the population. Of the State subvention fixed for the Churches it received

in 1922—23	61·1%
in 1924—25	45·1%
in 1926—27	48·0%

The *Roman Catholic Church* received:

in 1922—23	11·2%
in 1924—25	4·0%
in 1926—27	23·5%

although its adherents amount to 39·4 of the population.

The two *Protestant Churches* received

in 1922—23	0·2%
in 1924—25	0·4%
in 1926—27	0·3%

notwithstanding that they represent 1·8 of the population.

The *Jews* received

in 1922—23	0·0%
in 1924—25	0·16%
in 1926—27	0·76%

though they number 0·3 of the population.

The *Mohammedans* received

in 1922—23	17·2%
in 1924—25	14·3%
in 1926—27	14·5%

although they represent 11·1 of the population.

The generosity displayed towards the latter was a political reward for the part they played in voting for the Government and their Constitution.

X.

The Agrarian Reform in the Succession States.

The Succession States are using agrarian reform to destroy the material well-being of the minority peoples, just as their educational policy is endeavouring, contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaties, to destroy their culture.

In *Czechoslovakia* the agrarian reform was promulgated by the revolutionary National Assembly, which was not a legislature elected by the people, and in which the Hungarian minority was not represented at all.

Under this Act every estate exceeding 250 hectares was expropriated. The expropriated land was primarily distributed — either freehold, or on lease, — to Czech legionaries, to relatives of Czech soldiers, or to the heirs of Czech soldiers who had been killed in the war or had died during military service; secondarily, to agricultural, cooperative or other societies.

Act no. 215 of 1919 lays down as a fundamental principle that estates belonging to subjects of foreign countries may be expropriated without compensation.

Act no. 320 of 1920 fixes the average price fetched by land in 1913—15 at sales of over 100 hectares, as the amount of compensation to be paid. If we consider that the value of the crown of that time is assumed to be that of the Czech paper crown of to-day, it is obvious that this so-called expropriation is pure and simple confiscation. The great majority of the expropriated estates belonged to Hungarian landowners and the injustice of the proceeding is aggravated by the fact that the Czechs obtain the estates at a ridiculously low price, *i. e.* at one tenth of their present value, and that so far Hungarian claimants have always been excluded from the land distribution. We may mention that 63·3 per cent. of the Hungarian population are agriculturalists, of whom 48 per cent. are landless.

The colonisation scheme is also a great grievance of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. It has in a great measure been already carried out, and directly affects the districts peopled by Hungarians, — particularly the purely Hungarian *Csallóköz* (Grosse Schütte) along the borders of Hungary.

No less characteristic are the proceedings in regard to the so-called „residual estates“. If in any place expropriated land is left over after satisfying the Czech and Slovak claimants, the Hungarian claimants, to save appearances, receive small lots of 0·5—1·5 hectares, the rest being distributed in lots of 200—400 hectares among Czech politicians, party secretares, etc. — all people who probably never in their life had anything to do with a plough.

We must not suppose however that the former owner receives the indemnification he is entitled to in gold. He merely receives bonds bearing interest at the

rate of 3—4 per cent — the face value of the Czech crown of the day — from which the real and personal estate duties have been deducted.

Finally we must remember that the agrarian reform is not carried out by the Law Courts, — although it concerns the right of property, which is still the foundation of European society, — but by the Czech administrative authorities. We will refrain from exposing the extensive corruption prevailing at these expropriations, since this is done daily by the Slovak press itself.

The agrarian reform as carried out by *Roumania* is still less cheering; differing as it does in manner and method, its aim is the same: — the dispossession of the minorities.

The Roumanian Agrarian Act fixes the principle that 100—200 to 500 *hectares* are exempt from expropriation in Roumania proper according to the density of the population and the number of the claimants, while the Land Reform Act for Transylvania speaks of the same number of *cad. acres*. As a hectare is equal to 1.737 *cad. acres*, this means that the owners in the Regat are allowed to retain nearly double the amount of land allowed in Transylvania.

Landed property in the villages may be expropriated if it exceeds 30 *cad. acres* and urban building plots if they exceed 10 *cad. acres*, if leased between 1913 and 1918. Roumania proper is exempt from this. The Transylvanian Act further decrees that the estates of all those persons who have not been living on Roumanian territory since 1918 — the year of Transylvania's annexation, — shall be expropriated regardless of their extent. This provision (§ 8) has deprived of their land all those whom the Roumanian authorities had driven out of the country

by their persecutions or who opted for Hungarian nationality, although Article 63 of the Treaty of Trianon expressly states that the estates of the optants are to be exempt. It is from this procedure of the Roumanian Government that the whole vexed question of the optants sprang which has caused and still causes so much trouble to the League of Nations and such sensation in European politics. The Roumanian Agrarian Act also expropriated up to 5 cad. acres of the 12 cad. acres belonging to the Hungarian colonists, numbering upwards 2,000, who settled in the Bánát in 1885, during Hungarian rule; and seized most of the communal endowed and school property in the possession of Hungarian institutions and parishes, while it left the property of the Roumanian institutions undisturbed. For instance, the greater part of the property of the Hungarian frontier guards of *Csik*, consisting of 62,501 cad. acres, was expropriated, whereas that of the Roumanian frontier guards of *Karánsebes*, extending over 253,000 cad. acres, was left untouched.

If the corrupt methods and general injustice displayed in the course of these expropriations is a grievous offence to the Hungarian owners, the fixing of the indemnification price is a still greater one. The price of the expropriated land is to be calculated according to its value during the five years preceding 1913, and to be paid, not in cash, but in untransferable Roumanian State bonds yielding 5 per cent. This price moreover is not to be reckoned in the gold value of the *leu* of that time, but in the paper value of the *leu* of to-day. It is obvious that this paper *leu* payment falls far short of a proper and just indemnification.

The agrarian reform was carried out by so-called *agronomes* in a manner which amounted to nothing less

than a European scandal. The Roumanian Press takes the lead in exposing the abuses committed.

According to Roumanian returns, up to the end of 1925, 2,745,788 acres of land were expropriated in Transylvania, of which 798,723 acres are arable land, 1,168,408 acres forest, and the rest pastures, meadows, etc. Out of this total area, 711,028 acres have been distributed among 241,286 peasants, that is, not even three acres per head. On the other hand, an immense reserve of 925,350 acres, more than a third of the expropriated land, was retained by the State, and serves the political purposes of the Government, as is the case in Czechoslovakia.

Not one whit less oppressive is the agrarian reform in *Yugoslavia*, which has no agrarian Act, but only Government ordinances. In this country the fortunate recipients of land were all Slavs, — principally Serbs, — while the Hungarian claimants received not a single acre. The maximum of the unexpropriable land is fixed at 518 cad. acres if the owner has cultivated it himself with the aid of his family; if the land was leased the maximum left was 100 cad. acres. All estates exceeding this limit, as well as those belonging to foreign subjects, — the estates of the Hungarian optants not excepted, — are liable to expropriation. As the agrarian reform was at first called a „provisional measure” only, the land was not expropriated all at once. In 1919—1920 (when the Peace Treaty had not yet been concluded) it was let on a twelve months’ and later on a four years’ lease; since 1924 it has again been let till such time as the agrarian reform shall be made permanent. The former *dobrovoljac* (Serb Volunteers) however, were given permanent freeholds which were inscribed in the land

register. The rent was fixed in 1919—1920 at five times the net income per cad. acre and in 1920—1921 at eight times that amount. But the former landlord is not entitled to the whole of this sum; a quarter, or in some cases a third, must be paid to the Ministry of Agriculture to cover the expenses of the agrarian reform; the rates and taxes must also be paid by the former proprietor, together with the irrigation expenses, which amount to 30 per cent. A curious aspect of the Yugoslavian agrarian reform is that in this country the live stock and agricultural implements (horses, cattle, machinery and even farm buildings) were expropriated together with the land. As there is no definite Agrarian Act, no indemnification has been fixed for these and not a *dinar* has been paid up to the present. The annual rents must be paid to the account of the Minister of Agriculture, who will pay the former owner whatever is owing to him when the property finally changes hands. Thus for land which was taken ten years ago the owners have so far received no compensation whatever, notwithstanding the fact that "the distribution of land was completed" in 1924. Members of the minority peoples were excluded from putting in a claim for land by an order which pointed out that the right to opt for another nationality having been open to them at the time of the expropriation, they were not citizens of Yugoslavia. Article 43 of the Constitution provides that war volunteers and soldiers who fought for the freedom of *Yugoslavia*s should be the first to participate in the land distribution.

In consequence of this agrarian reform, wheat had to be imported into the Bánát and the Bácska, the two most fertile districts of pre-war Hungary, in 1926.

At present the situation is that the Hungarian landed proprietor class has been ruined and the Hungarian agricultural labourers living on the estates have been dispersed. The Serb mountaineers, who have been settled on the land, are ignorant of the agricultural methods of Southern Hungary, which were on a Western European level. For this reason they frequently sublet their property and only return at harvest time. Thus the ruin caused by the reform is complete. Even the chauvinistic Serb press states that Europe's „land of Canaan" has been thrown back one hundred years.

To illustrate the havoc worked, we give the following data: 395 estates aggregating 513,939 cad. acres belonging to alien owners — an average of 65·04 per cent. of the large estates — was broken up and distributed. The Slav recipients numbered 191,987. It is superfluous to mention that Hungarian claimants received nothing.

XI.

Civil and Political Rights of the Minorities.

Nearly ten years have elapsed since the Peace Treaties were concluded, and one might expect that the most primary right of the citizens of the new States, the right to their own nationality, would by now have been regulated, — especially as both the Trianon and the Minority Treaties provide for this in the most unequivocal manner. And yet this is not the case. To this day there are people living in the Succession States whose nationality may be challenged at any moment, with the most grievous consequences.

In *Czechoslovakia* the granting of Czech nationality is made dependent on domicile and the right to make out the certificate of domicile is reserved to the parish. Under Hungarian rule the right of domicile was automatically acquired by any person residing in one place for a period of five years and paying taxes there, so that it was superfluous to obtain a certificate of domicile. Consequently the late Hungarian subjects, — the present members of the minorities — have no such certificates to produce. The Czech Government demand these certificates, but the parishes refuse to issue them and so there are thousands of Hungarians living in *Czechoslovakia* who may be expelled at any moment simply because they

have no documentary evidence of their domicile. In consequence of this, they are left out of the parliamentary voters' registers, which means that they are not only deprived of their political rights, but also regarded as „politically unreliable” and so have the Damocles' sword of threatened expulsion continually suspended over their heads.

The administrative reform of Czechoslovakia has completely upset the former autonomous administration. The administrative districts have been changed and redistributed so as to reduce the preponderance of the minorities. The officials, who are almost exclusively Czechs, are appointed by the Government.

The autonomy promised by the Treaty of Trianon to the Ruthenians has never been carried out.

Even more distressing is the political situation of the minorities in *Roumania*. The malpractices perpetrated by the Government at the time of the parliamentary elections are well-known in Europe. The theft of ballot boxes, falsification of ballot papers and police brutality are all incidental to the exercise of the franchise in Roumania. Anyone interested in the „democratic” elections of the Balkans should read the Roumanian parliamentary reports, from which he will see that the police had received secret orders to interdict traffic two or three days before the general elections, as well as to drive away voters from the ballot boxes and to arrest the election agents of the opposition. Even the magistrates falsified voting papers.

These methods are sufficient to explain why the Hungarians cannot get proper representation in Parliament. At present they have only 9 members instead of the 30 to whom their numbers entitle them.

The situation is no better with regard to local administration. The counties and parishes have been deprived of their former autonomy. All administrative officials are appointed from Bucarest. Two fifths of the members of the county councils are appointed direct while three fifths are elected; but the Government has the power to dissolve the councils at any time and frequently does so.

The use of the minority languages is not allowed in the administration. In times past, under Hungarian rule, the minorities used their own language freely; and if one fifth of those present at the councils demanded it, the minutes had to be taken down also in a minority language.

To the Western mind a political „black list“ is a thing unknown. In Roumania lists of Hungarians who are considered „political unreliaables“ are put up in every town of Transylvania and sent by the police authorities to the *siguranza* (secret police) at Bucarest. And if the unfortunate Hungarian whose name appears in the list dares to take an active part in politics, he will be first warned, then arrested, and finally expelled from the country.

In *Yugoslavia* the acquisition of the right of citizenship has never been legally regulated; consequently there are thousands of hungarians whose nationality is a matter of uncertainty. The Government interprets in a most extraordinary manner the Articles on this subject contained in the Minority and Trianon Treaties. Both Treaties secure to the national minorities the right to opt for another nationality than the Serb. This has been interpreted to mean that, since the Hungarians have the right of option, they cannot be regarded as Yugoslav

subjects till the time limit of option has expired (June 26, 1922). Up to this date they were excluded from all participation in political life: they enjoyed no right of assembly, no liberty of thought or discussion; and they were left out of the voters' registers, so that they were unable to vote at the general elections of 1920. In 1923 and 1925, when new elections were held, only a very few Hungarians were put on the register, so that even apart from the official terrorism at the elections, — similar to that in Roumania — it would have been impossible for them to get a single one of their candidates elected. It was not until 1927 that they succeeded at last in sending two members to the *skuptschina*, although their number entitles them to 12 or 14 members. To this day not all Hungarian voters are entered on the voters' register.

The *Voivodina* was, until 1927, deprived of the communal and provincial autonomy which it had enjoyed during Hungarian rule. County Council elections were held for the first time in 1927, before which date the affairs of the counties, towns and parishes had been directed by councils appointed by the Government. The administrative officials were also appointed by the Government, not elected by the councils. So far no Law concerning administrative autonomy has been framed. The old divisions of the administrative territories have been upset, not from any practical motive, but with a view to Serb nationalist interests. To give but one example: the districts along the river *Tisza*, inhabited by a purely Hungarian population, have been joined on to *Belgrade* as the centre of the county, in spite of the fact that the *Danube* separates them from the latter and renders communication difficult.

Conclusion.

We have not described, or pretended to describe, every phase of the Hungarian problem. All we have been able to do was to touch the fringe of a few fundamental questions and to give a few facts and figures which will tell their own tale — a tale of broken contracts, racial and religious hatred, and the oppression and extermination of defenceless minorities.

For more than a century the racial minorities living in pre-war Hungary filled the world with their complaints about Hungarian tyranny. Yet their rights were guaranteed in fundamental Acts, their Churches were supported by the State and no distinction was made between them and the other citizens. If the Hungarians had wished to destroy or assimilate the minority peoples living in their midst, they had ample time and opportunity to do so in past centuries, and the story of the lost nationalities would by now be the subject of History. The events of the last fifteen years bear witness to the fact that the minority peoples in Hungary were allowed to live their cultural and economic life without interference; that, far from being persecuted, they had every opportunity given them to develop on their own lines.

More that that: they were able to follow a policy hostile to their native land and leading to the ultimate disruption of a stable, constitutional, geographic and historic entity such as was the Kingdom of Hungary.


Yet even though dismembered, Hungary is not broken. She exists, and can never forget that millions of her sons are suffering under a foreign yoke. Nor will she ever cease to repeat that her present frontiers are unjust and impossible, or to demand that the Treaties concerning the protection of the Hungarian minorities should be respected.

This is the „Problem of Hungary”, which cannot but be the problem of European peace as well.

WHAT HAS BEEN LEFT US.

FROM I. MAKOLDY'S BOOK









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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

IN THE PAST			
			
MAIZE 41.517,986mm.	POTATOES 51.673,408mm.	BEANS 2.225,875mm.	SUGARBEET 38.117,707mm.
IN THE PRESENT			
			
MAIZE 15.055,696mm.	POTATOES 19.458,893mm.	BEANS 699,951mm.	SUGARBEET 15.019,512mm.

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HORSES



44.8%

IN THE PAST 2,001,431

IN THE PRESENT 897,200



CZECHOSLOVAKIA
279.458



ROUMANIA
505.779



SERBIA
296.037



AUSTRIA
22.957


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CATTLE



IN THE PAST
6.184.204



IN THE PRESENT
2.150.099



CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1.360,055



ROUMANIA
2.065,713



YUGOSLAVIA
441,869



AUSTRIA
166,526

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
FORESTS

IN THE PAST



12.641,939 cad. acres

IN THE PRESENT



13.2%

1.825,181 cad. acres

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SALT

$\frac{1}{2}$
MILLION

1
MILLION

1
MILLION

TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 620.734 ^{mmt}
TO ROUMANIA: 1862.737 ^{mmt}

IN THE PAST 2.483,471 ^{mmt}.

AT PRESENT NIL

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NUMBER OF FACTORIES



48.09 %

IN THE PAST: 4,241

AT PRESENT: 2,075

HORSEPOWER OF THE FACTORIES

HP

HP

50.05 %

IN THE PAST: 798,049

AT PRESENT: 402,688


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MERCHANT NAVY



IN THE PAST
144,000 TON.



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